

A F I F T H
L E T T E R

TO THE

People of *England*.

On M-----L INFLUENCE.

A N D

Management of NATIONAL TREASURE.

3

*Idemdem cogitemus, si majus principibus, præstemus
obsequium, qui servitute civium, quam qui libertate
letantur.* PLIN.

*Let us consider, which have the best claim to our obedience;
those Princes, who delight in slavery; or those, who
take pleasure in the liberty of their Subjects.*

L O N D O N :

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A

LETTER

TO THE

People of *England*.

LETTER V.

IN a nation, whose constitution is founded on liberty, and whose Sovereign takes pleasure in maintaining the freedom of his subjects, public calamities and imminent dangers are so far from lessening their regard, that they animate them with more vigour and effect, to tender the tribute of their obedience to a King, and to promise their utmost efforts against his enemies; which in Britain is, on such occasions, commonly and legally expressed to his Majesty in the form of an *Address*.

WHAT then can be thought of those subjects, who, under any pretence, would endeavour to obstruct the means of this natural intercourse

between the King and the subject, and deprive both his Majesty of the greatest token of his being beloved by his people, and the subjects, of the opportunity to express their approbation or dislike of measures, on which the honour of the crown and the public safety manifestly depend?

AN opposition of this kind from a *Jewdizing* member! who stood *alone* in the council of the city of London for the naturalization of the Jews, might have passed unnoticed: or, had he been seconded by a descendant of such republicans, who submit to no King upon principle, it would have been despised: but to come from the senator, *idolized* by his fellow-citizens for his zeal on all former occasions; and generally the first promoter of their addresses to the throne, when either the glory of the crown, or the liberties of the subject, or the national property have been exposed to foreign or domestic foes, or threatened by ministerial schemes and misconduct is beyond comprehension! and not to be told without amazement!

FOR my own part, I can, and I presume, from its gracious reception by his Majesty, the King himself could find nothing in the city's address that did not become the language of his subjects, in their present circumstances, or unfit for the hearing of the sovereign of a free people. Does it throw any blame of their sorrows and complaints on his Majesty? No. The citizens acknowledge, "with hearts full of gratitude, his Majesty's

" Majesty's paternal care of the true interests of
 " his people." Was this too much for the op-
 ponents to acknowledge ? does it not condole
 with our Sovereign at " the disquietudes which
 " our late losses and disappointments must create
 " in the royal mind ?" Have these gentlemen
 lost all feeling ; or grown so callous, as to re-
 main insensible of the national sorrow and ap-
 prehensions at this juncture ? or so deficient in
 their duty to their King, as not only to refuse,
 but to strive to prevent the first corporation of
 the kingdom joining in an address, calculated
 " to alleviate and remove the disquietudes oc-
 " casioned by the loss of Minorca ; by the ha-
 " zardous situation of our possessions in Ameri-
 " ca ; the danger to which this nation is exposed
 " for want of a constitutional and well-regulated
 " militia : and to beseech his Majesty to direct
 " an enquiry into the authors of our late losses
 " and disappointments, to cause them to be
 " punished ; to entrust the management of the
 " public treasure in such hands, that the large
 " supplies, so necessarily called for, and so
 " chearfully granted, may be religiously applied
 " to the defence of these kingdoms and colonies,
 " and their commerce, and to the distressing of
 " our inveterate and perfidious enemies : and to
 " assure his Majesty of a readiness and chearful-
 " ness, at all times to contribute to whatever
 " may be necessary for the defence of him and
 " his illustrious family, and towards the attain-
 " ment of a lasting and honourable peace."

PROFESSIONS of duty, that were accepted with thanks by the sovereign : and representations of fears and dislike, which he acknowledges to be well-grounded and worthy of redress. Could there be a stronger confirmation of the justness of the citizens apprehensions for his Majesty's disquietude, than his declaration, " That his concern for the loss of Minorca is great and sincere ?" Did they ask more than an enquiry into, and the punishment of the authors of our misfortunes ? and does he not promise to do justice on those who shall be found wanting in their duty to their King and Country, and who have disobeyed their orders either by land or sea ? what then could induce that strenuous opposition to the city's address ? I should be loath to ascribe it a m——l influence over the father of the c——y ? is it possible, that one, who has so often appeared against bad measures, and had been forward in every proposal to inform his Majesty of the true interest of his kingdoms : who has recommended his wisdom, his integrity and zeal for his King and Country, by his activity against the iniquity of a general excise ; the indignity of the Spanish Convention ; the removal of evil counsellors ; the keeping up a standing army in time of peace, and against the exhausting of the national riches in subsidiary treaties ; the importation of foreign forces, and in an undue influence in both houses of p——t ; could ever attempt to secrete from the fountain of justice, the danger to which our property, our commerce, and even our liberty is reduced
by

by the persons, who have exhausted the E—q—r in treaties from whence Great Britain can reap no advantage, and want no assistance; while the enemy has been suffered to tear out of the jaws of the muzzled lion, a fortress, whose loss deprives us of our trade to Italy and Turkey, and our King of that dignity and weight, his strength in those seas always enforced upon the states on the Mediterranean shores?

Is it possible the same person could advise a war with Spain for procuring a free navigation in the West-Indies; and obstruct an enquiry into the causes or authors of the neglect of all our islands and settlements in America: by which they are well-nigh delivered up a prey to that enemy, who is our greatest rival in trade? could he ever act with sincerity of heart against subsidiary forces, and a standing mercenary army; who is afraid to remonstrate the expediency of a constitutional and regular militia, both in point of security and oeconomy to the nation? and ought not every man, that seeks to smother the crying sin of the m—l misapplication of the public money, be suspected an abettor of the political thief, and a receiver of the public plunder?

CAN any one deny, there have not been mismanagements and delays in our naval preparations; and in our military appointments? was there so much as an attempt by timely and effectual succours to prevent or defeat the attack on Minorca? were not the enemy's intentions known

known early enough to secure that island and fort against all opposition? or was not his Majesty's fleet superior to theirs? how could it be expected that three thousand five hundred men, in want of engineers, and most of their principal officers, could be able, unrelieved for upwards of ten weeks, to defend Fort St. Philip and its appendages, against eleven thousand Veterans, under old and experienced officers, assisted by able gunners and engineers, and in a capacity of being continually augmented with recruits? and should the persons guilty of this complaint be as dextrous in concealing the truth and excusing themselves to their royal master, as in shifting the crime, which way could the Prince, who takes pleasure in the liberty of his subjects, come to the knowledge of their grievances, had the m——l agents been sufficient to stop their mouths from addressing?

DID not the present war commence; and were not the extraordinary supplies granted in the last parliament for the support of the British right to the continent of North America, and of our trade with the natives? and will any one accuse us of disloyalty, disaffection, or disobedience for expressing apprehensions of the loss of our trade and possessions, when it was notorious, the enemy had not only strengthened themselves in their new encroachments, but were reinforced with men and implements of war for reducing our colonies to their obedience, before either troops or officers were so much as thought of for that service by our ministry? is it

it not aggravating to the people, who willingly parted with near eight millions of money for the American war ; to see the greatest part thereof expended in hiring troops from Germany and Russia ; in useless fleets, and in less useful encampments, in an island where there's no enemy to be feared, when the destroying sword of the uninterrupted foe has, for many months depopulated and carried devastation into most of our plantations ?

WHEN the subject is convinced, that none of these misfortunes are the effect of chance, but of weakness or want of integrity : and that they are the harbingers of slavery, his address to the Sovereign, and exertion of every other step, which the constitution authorizes, should recommend him to those honest men, who wish to have England continue the seat of freedom and justice. How dear then must they be to the King, who, in despite of m——l agents, and the tools of unconstitutional power, have set an example, by so glorious and necessary a measure, to support his dignity and crown, his dominions and independency against his enemies abroad, and against those, who abuse his power and authority at home ?

To point out the misfortunes, which endanger the fundamental principles of our constitution, and bring liberty to the brink of ruin : and to endeavour to unite men of all denominations in the support of the principles, and in the defence of the means by which the justice and honour of

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the

the nation are established and maintained, is the duty of good subjects, and the sole intention of their addresses. How despicable then must that patriot appear, who, after many years, being called out to join in an affair of so great and national importance, makes use of the confidence of his fellow-citizens to deter them from that duty? what a pity it is that such patriots cannot be new caulk'd and new bottomed like our ships, when they have laid long indolent in a state of tranquility!—Would not, in such a Case, that capital ship, *the St. John*, if thoroughly examined by a skilful master in politicks, be found most confoundedly eaten by ministerial worms, and perhaps be reported so rotten and crasy as not to be trusted on any service? but wherever the enemies of our country shall be found, by sea or land, at court or in the city, in town or country, may self-interest, dissension and terror haunt them and confound their measures! and may unanimity cement and guide those, who mean the publick and not their own emolument in their opposition to unconstitutional measures and to men not fit to be trusted with the liberties and property, the strength, riches, and safety of this nation; and who have always paid the strictest obedience to those princes, that took pleasure in the liberty of their subjects, but never could be forced to submit to those who delight in slavery.

WHEN a man's all is at stake, he has a right by the law of nature to bestir himself, and endeavour to secure it, if he can: and this right, which the law of nature gives, the laws of society

ty (unless he be a criminal) cannot take away. If this be allowed, I will venture farther to maintain, that, generally speaking, when a man's country is at stake, his all is at stake: because his country generally contains his all. And therefore it is every man's private right, in times of public danger, to bestir himself, and provide for the safety of his country; whether that be by opposing supine and ignorant measures, that have been taken at home, or by discovering the designs of the enemy, and preparing the minds of his fellow-citizens to listen to such schemes, as may best frustrate any hostile operations set on foot abroad.

THE man who checks this vigilant disposition in his neighbours, this general concern for the public welfare, in times, when it is so much endangered, will give great suspicion; let his rank and character be what they will; either that he has some connection or alliance with those, whose conduct the nation calls in question, or that he is, upon his own bottom, a secret enemy.

THESE things considered, I think, neither I, nor you, have reason to regard the untimely insolence of some people, who at this crisis affect to be monopolizers of the councils of their country, as being our first-rate politicians, though all Europe believes, and we, by sad experience have found them to be none at all. I shall therefore venture to submit to your consideration a scheme, which at the time I heard it, I took to be a good

one ; and will add the reasons, why I have been more confirmed in my opinion since.

It is briefly conceived in Dr. FREE's first *Antigallican* sermon, preached before Admiral VERNON, when he was grand president. The author speaking of the necessity of finding means to retain our sailors, and support a powerful navy, even in the times of peace, subjoins a gentle reproof to what was at that season a common prejudice — " Though, my good countrymen ! " says he, " Let not French artifice, and politics, " working upon your own sanguine conceit of " things, so far delude a *British* mind, as to " make you think that the fleet of England in all " its glory, will of itself preserve to you the do- " minion of the sea, or secure to you peace and " safety in your own habitations.

" (THE ballance of power, abroad must ever
" be preserved) If the French can once persuade
" you, that you have no concern on the conti-
" nent, (by which they mean, that you should
" give it up to them) while you are parading it
" upon the ocean (for some of our expeditions
" by sea, have not been quite so successful as
" those conducted by our much honoured pre-
" sident) I say, while you are parading it upon
" the ocean, they, by an uninterrupted land-
" war may swallow, one after another, the lesser
" provinces and kingdoms on the neighbouring
" coast, and consequently get into their hands
" all their builders, mariners, and shipping ;
" and then, being possessed of, or having under
" their

“ their direction every port from the Italian
 “ shore, up the Atlantic to the German ocean,
 “ they would not only overpower your fleets, by
 “ out-numbering your shipping, in a proportion
 “ on which would amaze you ; but also soon
 “ give you to understand, that you had another
 “ element to maintain, as well as water, by attempting
 “ to land, in almost every maritime
 “ county.

“ THEN, how are you to withstand them ?
 “ why, truly, by the same means that you might
 “ at first have checked them ; not by a small body
 “ of mercenary troops, which (though valiant,
 “ and very useful to quell any popular tumult)
 “ can never be equal to the many calls and
 “ movements of a sudden invasion, especially
 “ in such wide countries as these his Majesty’s
 “ Imperial dominions. No ! in this case,
 “ we can never be so properly assisted, as by an
 “ able, faithful, and every where extended
 “ MILITIA. Look back, I beseech you, to the
 “ example and experience of your forefathers.
 “ Their conduct will never delude you ; time,
 “ fame, and fortune have set their seals to their
 “ wisdom.

“ How was it that our Edwards and our Hen-
 “ ries conquered France ? they had shipping in
 “ proportion to the French, as we have now, or
 “ more :—but they had men as well as shipping ;
 “ and whence had they their men, but from
 “ their MILITIA ? I would ask but one question
 “ more ; how did they use them ? Why, when
 “ the

“ the enemy grew turbulent, and were for *spread-*
 “ *ing* themselves beyond their *boundary*, they
 “ made a descent upon their territory and found
 “ them proper employment in their own coun-
 “ try.”

Now, I take this advice to be very good : be-
 cause it promises the entire defeat of a scheme,
 which has lately been projected in France upon
 the idea of our national weakness, and loss of
 our martial spirit. I give it the reader in the
 manner in which it has appeared in the public
 papers.

“ *Paris, July 18.]* We are told that the court
 “ notwithstanding all the defensive preparations
 “ made in Great-Britain, still meditates a descent
 “ on that island, well knowing how fatal would
 “ be the seat of war to that flourishing nation,
 “ and how little disposed its inhabitants are to
 “ be spectators of it : a recent instance of which
 “ in the last invasion of Scotland, when the in-
 “ roads of a few paultry vagabonds, headed by
 “ an *handful* of his Majesty's troops, gave a fi-
 “ nishing stroke to the war ; being more effectua-
 “ al to procuring the succeeding peace, than all
 “ our successors in the Netherlands ; the love of
 “ ease and self-indulgence, the present character-
 “ istic of the English nation, rendering them
 “ entirely incapable to support a war, but at a
 “ distance. A project is therefore on foot, to
 “ strike the enemy in the most sensible part ; the
 “ numberless resources, which we must draw
 “ from abroad, and they find at home, making
 “ such

“ such conduct absolutely necessary : the court
 “ conceiving, that by a long distant war ; in
 “ support of its pretensions, a greater sacrifice
 “ will be made of its subjects, and probably to
 “ less purpose, than by a speedy, though bloody
 “ enterprize directed home. It is said also, that
 “ this expedition will attend the most favourable
 “ opportunity, when, as the steps already taken
 “ will absolutely require, the force of the enemy
 “ is divided ; at which time it will be attempted
 “ in two distant parts of the kingdom, by which
 “ we hope to determine the limits of Acadia,
 “ better in the garden of Great Britain than in
 “ the wilds of America.”

If these be the advantages, which the French
 propose to reap, by making England the seat of
 war : common sense must incline us to follow the
 doctor's advice, for turning these miseries from
 our own coast to theirs, and being before-hand
 with them in an invasion.

To make this the more successful, I will sup-
 pose, that Admiral Hawke shall immediately join
 the Corsicans, which will occasion a great draught
 from the French forces, for another expedition in
 the Mediterranean. The King of Sardinia, if
 he sees us so active may then give those which
 remain no little trouble on the side of Provence ;
 and while these things are doing to the south and
 east ; and the King of Prussia advances from the
 north : suppose we make a small experiment up-
 on the west.

WHY should not our forces, for the sake of exercise, learn the method of quick debarking as well as the French? and why should not this be done on some of the islands very near the continent; Chaufey, for instance: or else on some part of the coast of Normandy itself? and as this is an ancient appendage of the crown of England, and the Normans have lately shewn themselves greatly offended at the ill behaviour of the *French* court toward their parliaments, suppose our soldiers were to carry in their hands some thousands of his Majesty's gracious declaration:—“ That
 “ out of a paternal concern for his ancient subjects of the Dutcheys of Normandy, he cannot
 “ tamely look on and see their privileges so
 “ grossly invaded by the usurping power of the
 “ court of France; and therefore he hath sent a
 “ large detachment of his forces to assist them,
 “ in the recovery of their lost liberty, and will
 “ not only grant to them the free cession of those
 “ municipal assemblies, which they call a parliament, but also the meeting of their ancient
 “ states, under a Duke of their own, of whom
 “ nothing more shall be demanded, but that he
 “ be an homoger and ally of England, &c.”


SUCH an attempt and declaration as this might make no small stir amongst the hardy Normans, which would occasion an immediate movement in the camp of Dunkirk; and not only set them at a greater distance from the coast of England; but also, as my author expresses it find them proper employment in their own country.

How

How a project of this sort may appear to some of our politicians, I cannot tell; but as the French have shewn to the world, that they penetrate much further into things than we; I shall give upon this occasion their own sentiments, which sufficiently declare the jealousy they have, of the use we may make of Normandy. A French writer had been asked, why the children of France did not bear the title of Dukes of Normandy; and he replies, "*C'est parce qu'il auroit fallu leur faire en appanage: et cette province étant celle, qui rend le plus au Roi, et le plus voisine de L'Angleterre, elle auroit été une occasion a son Prince de Causer de troubles dans le Royaume*" — *La science des personnes de la cour, &c.* Tom. ii. p. 18.

HAVING lost all the great advantages which we set out against the French, and from the most promising prospect of affairs, been reduced both in Europe and America to the most desperate state, which either carelessness, ignorance, treachery, or all together, could involve us in; the question is, *what ought to be done, or can be done?* are we really in a condition to support ourselves against the whole Power of France, which hath been so kindly brought upon us by exclusive and inconsistent treaties? or are we under a necessity of making peace to avoid being utterly ruined by the war?

I put the question, because I perceive that the authors of all our misfortunes have already begun by suggestions in the news-papers, to sound
C whether



whether a peace would be acceptable to the public. What! have our conductors, averſe all along to war, brought it to this already? hath Minorca been loſt in order to introduce a ſtill worſe evil, peace: and force us into a meaſure advantageous to themſelves, but deſtructive to the nation? was war made only to gain peace, by ſuffering ſuch an immenſe loſs? or will thoſe who cauſed that loſs, have the ſtill greater preſumption to propoſe peace before they have indemnified the nation for it? In ſhort, ſhall peace be made at a time when the war ſhould be purſued more vigorously than ever? ſhall peace be made, and the French ſuffered to keep poſſeſſion of Port Mahon? No: ſooner let us run all the riſques of war.

YET it muſt not be imagined, that Minorca, were it to be ceded, would ſatisfy the French. Flushed with their ſucceſs, in having conquered ſuch an important fortrefs; they will not be content with what they have already acquired; eſpecially, as they know Great Britain (by this loſs grown *little*) can never recover it again, unleſs they deſert its defence in the ſame ſhameful manner that our good conductors have done. No, by this acquiſition, and other ſtrange management on our ſide, they know they have gotten from us theſe great advantages, which at firſt we had againſt them; and therefore will not part with it, unleſs we give them ſomething in lieu thereof, which they may look on as an equivalent.

NOBODY

NOBODY can doubt, but the equivalent, which they would require, is the River of St. John in Nova Scotia, on account of which they forged their two contradictory systems of ancient limits, and began the war: and as they know that the possession of that river will be of infinitely more advantage to them than Minorca, this island will at last perhaps be offered by them in exchange.

THE requisition of a river, which runs through the midst of anothers country, has something in it equally absurd and immodest, as it is a demand no less unfit to be made than to be complied with. It is an insidious way, concerted perhaps between both parties, of asking the whole country, under the appearance of asking only a part; since it is evident, that whoever is possessed of one will be possessed of the other: but 'tis hoped the public will not be imposed on by so gross an artifice.

THE French pretend, that they want this river for a communication all the year round with Canada; but, supposing we ought to disoblige ourselves to oblige them; yet, as they never alledged this till now, it is clear, that the demand proceeds from another motive, namely, the advancement of their long concerted plan, to surround our American settlements on this side, as they have already on the other sides, by depriving us of a frontier province, which is the chief security of our norther ncolonies. They have in view likewise

to get a port or rather ports, with which this country abounds, on the Atlantic ocean, where they have none at present; from whence they might be able at any time to infest our colonies and disturb our commerce; particularly the fishing-trade, which by degrees they would get into their own hands. In short, the surrender of St. John's River would be high treason against our colonies.

WOULD it not be another proof of inability to ruin their country, if to make amends for giving up, or losing one important place, they should give up a much more important place? a spacious province four hundred and twenty miles long, in lieu of a single fortress; which though of great moment to our power as well as commerce, yet being detached from the body of Great Britain, cannot prove a thorn in its side, as it would, if immediately connected therewith, in the same manner as St. John's River or Nova Scotia (for in this case they must be considered as synonymous) is connected with New England.

AFTER all, the cession of St. John's River would procure a peace but for a short season. For the French, as soon as ever they had strengthened their American territories, by forts properly disposed with numerous garrisons, and augmented their marine to a degree capable of coping with our naval power (which would be their first and whole care) would begin their encroachments afresh and without reserve. That this
would

would be the case, is evident from their conduct ever since the peace of Aix la Chapelle ; for they seem determined not only to be superior to us in power, but to be masters in America, unless prevented by us at the present juncture ; which is the only opportunity in all appearance we shall ever have again to hinder them from completing our ruin. So that should we make peace with the French till we have effectually humbled them, we must either suffer them to encroach on our colonies at pleasure, without any opposition, or else to go to war again at a time when we shall be no more match for them, than a mouse is for a cat ; or than they were for us at the commencement of hostilities. For the same cause that will oblige us now to make peace must hinder us hereafter from going to war ; in which case we must lie, wholly, at the mercy of France.

BUT where can be the necessity for any peace at all, much less a destructive and ignominious peace ? such as that would be, by which Minorca and Nova Scotia, or either of them, shall be sacrificed to our enemies. Can it with any colour be pretended that it is necessary, because there are not ways and means for raising money to carry on the war ; when yet there is a ready method of raising both men and money more than sufficient for the purpose ? indeed, if money must be raised in the exhausting way now in use, and then squandered in hiring foreign troops at a most extravagant price ; I grant that it may not be practicable to raise enough to carry on the war ; but if a *national militia* be once established
(one

(one hundred and fifty thousand of whom may be maintained at less expence than sixteen thousand foreigners) and money raised without increasing the publick debt, by one general, tax upon houses, or the like, it will be no difficult matter to find money for carrying on the war, as long as necessary to do ourselves justice.

HAVE not the people then a right to demand, and obtain this change of measures? Yes, surely, unless it can be proved, that it is better for them to want security and defence, than to have ministers removed from whom they can expect neither; and to be destroyed by an ignominious peace, than saved by measures which will prevent their running further in debt, will keep their money in the country, and enable them to pursue hostilities with vigour and success against their natural, inveterate, and most perfidious enemies.

SURE the parliament who saw the utmost necessity for this war, cannot be supposed to have acted a collusive part, by promising the King to carry on the same with vigour, at a time when they knew it was not in their power to raise supplies for the purpose another year? as they must have been utterly incapable of any such dishonourable proceeding, and fully determined to make good their engagements to the throne; so the nation may depend on it, that they will raise money and defend the kingdom, in the manner we have mentioned, if no other methods equally advantageous can be found, rather than suffer

suffer such an inglorious, such a ruinous measure, as peace, to take place, till we have recovered not only Minorca, but all our rightful possessions in America ; for which end the war was undertaken ; which might have been done before now, if affairs had been well conducted, and which it is still in our power to effect, if proper measures be pursued under wise and faithful managers.

THE ingenious *Monf. de Montesquin* in his *L'Esprit des Loise*, speaking of the LIBERTY of the English nation ; says, " It will be lost when " the *Legislative* shall become more corrupt than " the *Executive*."

THOUGH we hope this gentleman's prediction is still far from its completion ; yet, as Britons can never be too jealous of, nor too vigorously oppose any steps, that may tend towards the loss of so inestimable a jewel, we cannot but complain, that many circumstances do, at this juncture, bear a very unfavourable aspect to the liberties of this land.

ARE not our heavy taxes and enormous debts, our v——l boroughs and ministerial influence in parliament, our neglecting to regulate our militia, and our calling over an army of foreigners into this nation, omens, that forebode no good to British liberty ?

HEAVY oppressive taxes do, indeed, as naturally tend to sink men's spirits, and make them
flavish

slavish, as fasting does to make them hungry : and would not the venality of our boroughs put it as certainly into the power of ministers to subvert the constitution by law, as the introduction of foreign troops, and the neglecting to regulate the militia, might impower the soldiery to rob us of our rights and liberties by force ?

By calling over a foreign army, it should seem we were afraid of an invasion ; but by our neglecting to regulate our militia, it should seem, we had no such fear, What then can be said of such mongrel measures ? were we, or were we not afraid of an invasion ? if we were not : why was a foreign army brought over ? if we were, why was the regulation of our militia neglected ? is not the introduction of Hanoverian forces contrary to the act of settlement ? but that hath been so often broke through, that we might be justly taxed with folly, should we lay any great stress upon it.

If the nation was in any real danger of an invasion, would not our militia, properly disciplined, have certainly been a stronger defence against it than any number of foreign forces ? besides, the one is according to our constitution ; the other directly opposite to it : the one would strengthen the hands and unite the hearts of his Majesty's subjects ; the other not only keeps them weak, but tends to create jealousies and disaffection.

THERE

THERE surely never was a time, when the people of this kingdom were in general so disarmed, as at the present juncture: and yet, it should seem, there never was a time, that was more likely to require the use of arms.

WE have been told from Hanover, that the militia there, were with the utmost assiduity, learning the art and exercise of arms, as the *propereſt* and *moſt natural* defence against an invasion: why should not the same step, which is thought prudent to be taken in his Majesty's Electorate, be thought prudent also in his Majesty's Kingdom?

GENTLEMEN can associate from one end of the kingdom to the other, for the preservation of patridges; how much more prudent, how much more honourable, how much more like Britons, would it be, would they form an association to establish a well-disciplined militia for the defence of their King and Country!

THE calling over foreign troops to defend us, doth indeed, on the best construction, and in the most favourable light we can possibly look upon it, reproach us with being weak, effeminate, and unmartial. Would our ancestors, (it makes me blush to name them) would they who conquered at Cressy, have ever thought of calling over foreign forces to defend themselves against the French? would they have neglected to arm
D them-

themselves, and shamefully trusted the safety of the King's crown, and their own rights and liberties to foreign troops?

BUT how are Britons changed! how sunk into stupidity! how lost to all sense of honour and their country's interest! how spaniel-like must they be, who, enamoured with their chains, can survey with delight the whiskered army, and praise its beauty, manners, and regularity!

OUR ancestors, whose virtues are a disgrace to us, were so justly jealous of their rights and liberties, that they would never so much as suffer any standing army to be kept up in times of peace; and even we, their degenerate race, have hitherto pretended to look upon such forces as an unconstitutional body, by providing for them only from year to year.

BUT do not the edifices lately erected, and the barrack now building for them, too evidently shew, that no part of our constitution hath more health and strength, than they, or is likely to outlive a standing army.

THE building of barracks for the soldiers seems to me to be a measure big with mischievous consequences! for will not that, which makes a separation of the soldiery from the rest of his Majesty's subjects in their way and manner of living, naturally beget a separation of interests? and will not that consequently tend
to

to introduce a military power independant on the civil? and will not such power necessarily lessen the security of those rights we hold by law? the laws of this land and a large standing army are, indeed incompatible: the one or the other must be abolished.

No nation, upon earth, ever did hitherto preserve their liberties, where a large standing army was allowed. Why, therefore, should we suppose, that the same cause will not with us have the same effect, or that our freedom will not follow their fate?

How the rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom were oppressed by a standing army in the time of the Long Parliament, appears by a book published in the year 1649, in which are the following words. "For if a word, which
 " is a warrant from the general, or peradventure
 " no word of his, but a counterfeit, which nei-
 " ther dare he deny to allow, come into the breast
 " of a soldier, that a lord, gentleman, or citi-
 " zen is rich and hath money, presently the party
 " so (and no more) offending, is taken into
 " custody, and so is his estate, which hath no
 " means but the smallness of it, to free it from
 " delinquency: but if the sum be of quantity
 " to find grace in their eyes, the master may
 " again sleep quietly in his own house, provided
 " he stir not to complain, till his dear friends
 " come again, or send for him, in which space,
 " they skreen themselves from danger, and per-
 " suade or threaten the general to avow their
 D 2 ' theft.

“ theft. Thus England, which was come to
 “ the very height of an Atlantis or Utopica, a
 “ government excellent as could be wished, is
 “ now become an India or Ethiopia, or rather
 “ a Greenland, where, when the Bears, which
 “ are the laws, are gone to sleep, the FOXES,
 “ which are the cunning destroying knaves,
 “ creep abroad.”

THE army, that thus robbed and plundered the people at their pleasure, did, at last murder their King, and turn the people's representatives out of doors. Such are the dreadful effects of a large standing army! against which, and all steps, that may lead thereto, Britons can never guard too carefully.

As it is the undoubted interest of a people to preserve their rights and freedom; so it is the interest and true honour also of a King to rule over a free people. It is the true glory of a King to reign in the hearts of his people, and to enjoy their willing obedience. Is it not a dishonourable title to be called a King of slaves?

It is the weakness of human nature, that prompts Kings to desire the possession of a power of making their subjects miserable. The laws allow Kings all the power they can desire of doing good, and only restrain them from doing mischief. No good King, such as our present Sovereign, did ever desire the power of doing his subjects harm. It is the frailty of flesh and blood that incites Kings to covet a power of doing as they

they please, and of governing according to their own will and pleasure ; and when they have procured such power, what have they obtained more than they possessed before, but the power of rejecting reason, and ruling according to their passions.

HENCE it is, that the more arbitrary and despotic Kings have been, the less firm and permanent also their crowns have been ; for no mercenary army can give a King strength equal to the love of his subjects, nor can any throne be so secure as his, who rules according to reason.

IF Kings will but peruse and seriously consider the reigns of their predecessors, and the reigns of all former princes, they would clearly discern, that those, who placed their confidence on their people, and governed according to the established laws of the land, were ever the most prosperous and happy : and that those, who, either through their own mistaken notions of government, or through the seducement of wicked ministers, in order to escape the punishment due to their crimes, contended for an arbitrary power, and put their trust in mercenary troops, were ever unhappy and inglorious.

DOTH not history afford us numberless instances of standing armies setting aside the legal succession of Princes in a reigning family ? nay, indeed, of their placing the crown on the head of one of a different house ? how often were the Roman, the Grecian, the Eastern Emperors placed

placed and displaced at the pleasure and caprice of their own mercenary troops? but when was there one instance of a king's being dethroned, who placed his confidence on the affection of his people, and ruled according to the laws of the land? From hence, it seems to me certain, that the true interest of King and People is one and the same, and inseparable; and that a large mercenary army is equally dangerous to both.

An E D I C T.

WHEREAS the loss of his m---y's Island of Minorca, has given universal dissatisfaction to the subjects of this realm, who, suspending their particular dissensions, unanimously concur, in demanding a strict scrutiny into the management, which occasioned that unfortunate event: We, considering that such an en---y would strike at the very essence of our power, think proper to command, and do hereby command, all our trusty and well-beloved dependants, who hold c---s, either c---I or m---y; all expectants, levee-hunters, M--B--RS, *durante bene placito*, toad-eaters, &c. &c. &c. in all coffee-houses, taverns, and places of public resort, to insist upon, and strongly inforce, the misbehaviour of a certain a---I in the Mediter-

diterranean ; thereby endeavouring, with their utmost power, to fix the disgrace of the said misfortune solely upon him, and divert the public attention from the *original source* of the nation's dishonour.

AND we do strictly require all our several dependants, as aforesaid, not to presume, upon any account whatsoever, to signify, intimate, or suggest, the least disapprobation of the measures, we have thought proper, for reasons best known to ourselves, to pursue at the peril of their commissions, places, or future prospects ; solemnly declaring, that not a single shrug of the shoulders, or shake of the head shall at this time of imminent danger to our authority, pass unnoticed. Moreover, we recommend it to our good friends as aforesaid, to insinuate, upon every proper occasion, that the commander of Fort St. Philip might, notwithstanding every discouragement, that could depress a garrison, have held out, until a fighting admiral came to his relief. But this point, we direct, may be managed with great delicacy, being sensible, that it will be a matter of no small difficulty, to derogate from the honour, which even the enemy concurs with the nation, in conferring upon that inflexible veteran.

THIS end notwithstanding, confiding in long experience, we hope may be effected, by operating properly on the prejudices, entertained against the kingdom, which boasts the glory of having produced that hero. And you are not
to

to fail in a literal compliance with these our injunctions, CAR TEL EST NOTRE PLAISIR.

GIVEN upon mature deliberation, this 24th day of August, 1756.

CHATO—NEUF.
LOVEGOLD, C.
RENARD.
AQUAPULCO.

ADVISEMENT.

WANTED by the middle of *November* next, a Person, that is a perfect master of *packing, shuffling and cutting* cards; he must know how to get the **HONOURS** into his own hand; he must be always sure of an **ODD TRICK**, and perfectly understand the art of *saving* a **KNAVE** by the subtle and crafty *play and application* of his **KING**.

WHOEVER is *thus qualified*, may hear of very advantageous terms, by applying to Goody **MAHON** in *Lincoln's-Inn Fields*, or Madam **MULL-MARRIAGE** in *Great-Ormond-Street*.



F I N I S.

